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INTRODUCTION 
The Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Edwards1 
demonstrates its intent to change the Illinois successive postconviction 
actual innocence standard to parallel the federal habeas actual innocence 
gateway standard.  The Edwards court’s muddled holdings and reliance on 
U.S. Supreme Court cases Schlup v. Delo2 and Sawyer v. Whitley3 
demonstrate that objective.  However, such an objective is unfounded and 
unnecessary.  Edwards was wrongly decided, and therefore, the Illinois 
Supreme Court should reverse Edwards and return to the standard set forth 
in People v. Ortiz.4 
Illinois has a long history of allowing prisoners to file postconviction 
actual innocence petitions.  In 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court boldly 
declared in People v. Washington5 that it would interpret the Illinois 
constitution’s due process clause differently from the way the U.S. Supreme 
Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in 
Herrera v. Collins6 by recognizing a substantive due process claim of actual 
innocence.7  The Illinois Supreme Court majority wrote: 
We think that the Court overlooked that a “truly persuasive demonstration of 
innocence” would, in hindsight, undermine the legal construct precluding a 
substantive due process analysis.  The stronger the claim—the more likely it is that a 
convicted person is actually innocent—the weaker is the legal construct dictating that 
the person be viewed as guilty. . . .  We believe that no person convicted of a crime 
should be deprived of life or liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence.8 
In essence, by recognizing a substantive due process claim for actual 
innocence, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that the Illinois constitution 
would give actual innocence claims greater protection than would the 
Federal Constitution.9 
Any postconviction petition filed after the first petition is considered a 
successive postconviction petition.  Until Edwards, the standard for a court 
granting leave to file a successive postconviction actual innocence petition 
required the petitioner’s claim to be “of such conclusive character that it 
 
1 969 N.E.2d 829 (Ill. 2012). 
2 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 
3 505 U.S. 333 (1992). 
4 919 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. 2009). 
5 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996). 
6 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
7 See id. at 404, 407 n.6; Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1337. 
8 Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1336 (emphasis added) (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417). 
9 Id. at 1337. 
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would probably change the result [of] retrial.”10  In Edwards, the court 
described a winning successive postconviction actual innocence petition as 
one in which the petitioner puts forth a “colorable claim of actual 
innocence” through documentation that raises the probability that “it is 
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in 
the light of the new evidence.”11  On one hand, the court may have relaxed 
the standard for granting leave of court to file a successive postconviction 
petition by using the term “colorable.”  On the other hand, despite the 
court’s recent suggestion to the contrary,12 the court may have made it more 
difficult by using the phrase “no reasonable juror.”13  Additionally, the 
Edwards court cited federal case law and used language directly from 
Schlup.14  The muddled language and conflicting precedent in Edwards has 
left lower courts and practitioners confused because of the possibility that it 
created a new standard for granting leave of court for successive 
postconviction actual innocence petitions. 
This Comment will demonstrate how Edwards created a more 
stringent standard for granting leave of court to file successive 
postconviction actual innocence petitions that resembles the federal habeas 
actual innocence gateway standard.  Part I provides background on the 
Illinois Postconviction Act, relevant Illinois case law, the federal habeas 
actual innocence gateway standard, and the Edwards decision.  Part II 
untangles the language of Edwards and examines the effects of the decision 
in the Illinois appellate courts.  Part III addresses policy considerations both 
for and against a more stringent standard and demonstrates why Edwards 
was wrongly decided and should be reversed.  Finally, Part IV describes the 
implications for the Illinois Supreme Court’s position. 
 
10 People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 950 (Ill. 2009) (quoting People v. Morgan, 817 
N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004)); accord People v. Munoz, 941 N.E.2d 318, 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2010). 
11 Illinois v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Ill. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 
298, 327 (1995)). 
12 The Illinois Supreme Court declared, “[o]ur commitment” to the Washington standard 
“is unwavering. . . .  [W]e have not strengthened that standard, as the State hopes we did in 
Edwards.  In both cases, we reiterated that Washington provides the appropriate standard for 
ultimate relief.”  People v. Coleman, No. 113307, 2013 WL 5488934, ¶ 93 (Ill. Oct. 3, 
2013); see infra note 141. 
13 Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 836. 
14 Id. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE POSTCONVICTION HEARING STATUTE 
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act)15 allows prisoners 
to collaterally attack their convictions on constitutional grounds.16  The Act 
provides an additional remedy for them to pursue claims that were not made 
on direct appeal or that are based on facts not in the record.17  The Act is 
composed of three stages of review for first petitions; if the petitioner 
successfully passes through all three stages, the petitioner will be granted a 
retrial.18 
1. Stage One 
The first stage of the Act, often filed pro se, requires the petitioner’s 
claim to survive summary dismissal.19  To survive dismissal, the petitioner 
must give “a gist” of a claim.20  The court of appeals has found petitions 
that provide newly discovered evidence that is neither fantastic nor 
delusional are sufficient to support a “gist of a meritorious claim.”21  If the 
judge fails to find “a gist” of a claim, the judge will dismiss the claim as 
“frivolous or patently without merit.”22  The judge is required to give 
reasons in a written order for dismissing these claims as “frivolous or 
patently without merit.”23  The State is not allowed to respond at this 
 
15 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 (2010). 
16 See Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 947; Kerry J. Bryson, A Guide to the Illinois Post-conviction 
Hearing Act, 91 ILL. B.J. 248, 248 (2003). 
17 Bryson, supra note 16, at 248–49. 
18 Id. at 249. 
19 See People v. Porter, 521 N.E.2d 1158, 1159–62 (Ill. 1988) (holding dismissal of 
postconviction petitions constitutional); Bryson, supra note 16, at 249–50. 
20 See Bryson, supra note 16, at 249 & n.18 (citing People v. Edwards, 757 N.E.2d 442, 
445–46 (Ill. 2001) (noting the “gist” threshold and describing an earlier People v. Edwards 
as “criticiz[ing] several appellate court decisions holding that petitioner must plead sufficient 
facts from which the trial court could find a valid claim of deprivation of a constitutional 
right, noting that this standard imposes too heavy a burden on petitioner and conflicts with 
precedent which requires only a limited amount of detail” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
21 People v. Sparks, 913 N.E.2d 692, 698–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see also Edwards, 757 
N.E.2d at 452–53 (finding that a pro se petitioner’s statement that his attorney at trial refused 
his request to appeal constituted a gist of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel). 
22 Bryson, supra note 16, at 249; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2 (2010). 
23 Bryson, supra note 16, at 249; see People v. Collins, 782 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ill. 2002) 
(upholding a district court’s dismissal of the petition as frivolous and patently without merit 
because the petition contained no affidavits, records, or other evidence or explanation for 
why such supporting documentation was not included). 
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stage.24  The petitioner may appeal, and the appellate court then applies a de 
novo review standard.25 
2. Stage Two 
If the petitioner successfully passes stage one, the petitioner moves to 
the second stage of securing an evidentiary hearing.26  At this stage, the 
court may appoint counsel for the petitioner if the petitioner cannot afford 
one.27  To successfully secure an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must 
make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a Brady violation, or actual innocence.28  The record 
must also show that (1) appointed counsel ascertained petitioner’s 
deprivation of his or her constitutional rights by consulting with the 
petitioner in person or by mail, (2) counsel examined the trial record, and 
(3) counsel made any necessary changes to the pro se petition.29  Appointed 
counsel must demonstrate that these requirements have been met, or any 
subsequent dismissal of the petition will be reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings under the Act.30  The State may answer or move to 
dismiss the petition at this stage.31  However, all “well-pleaded facts that are 
not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true,”32 and 
waiver and res judicata claims may be waived by the court “when the 
 
24 See Bryson, supra note 16, at 249; see also People v. Gaultney, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 
(Ill. 1996); People v. Ponyi, 734 N.E.2d 935, 939–40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
25 Bryson, supra note 16, at 250. 
26 Id. 
27 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-4 (explaining that “the court shall appoint counsel if 
satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel”). 
28 See People v. Beaman, 890 N.E.2d 500, 502 (Ill. 2008) (examining a postconviction 
petition alleging a Brady violation); see also People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 948–49 (Ill. 
2009); People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004); People v. Washington, 665 
N.E.2d 1330, 1336–37 (Ill. 1996).  A Brady violation occurs when the prosecution fails to 
disclose material evidence favorable to the accused, a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) 
(“[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 
due process . . . .”). 
29 Bryson, supra note 16, at 250 (citing ILL. SUP. CT. R. 651(c)). 
30 Id. at 250; see ILL. SUP. CT. R. 651(c) (“The record filed in that court shall contain a 
showing, which may be made by the certificate of petitioner’s attorney, that the attorney has 
consulted with petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain his or her 
contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, has examined the record of the 
proceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are 
necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.”); see also People v. 
Guest, 655 N.E.2d 873, 887 (Ill. 1995) (holding that absence of a Rule 651(c) certificate is 
harmless if the record shows that counsel satisfied the Rule’s requirements). 
31 Bryson, supra note 16, at 251. 
32 Id. at 250 (quoting People v. Childress, 730 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ill. 2000)). 
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record on appeal is insufficient to support the petitioner’s claim, where the 
alleged waiver stems from ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, 
where the law on an issue has changed since that issue was considered and 
rejected, or where fundamental fairness so requires.”33  This stage is also 
appealable with a de novo standard of review.34 
3. Stage Three 
The last stage of the Act grants the petitioner an evidentiary hearing to 
put on his evidence in the hope of securing a new trial.35  The petitioner 
bears the burden of showing that his constitutional rights were violated.36  
The petitioner may appeal the decision, but the standard of review on such 
an appeal is “manifestly erroneous,” a significantly higher standard than the 
de novo standard applied in the previous two stages.37  Thus, the trial 
court’s determination at the third stage will likely be final and probably will 
not be reversed on appeal. 
4. Successive Postconviction Petitions 
It is well established that the Act “contemplates the filing of a single 
post-conviction petition.”38  However, a court may grant leave for 
successive petitions if the petitioner can show that “fundamental fairness” 
requires it.39  Courts employ the “cause and prejudice” test to determine 
whether prior postconviction petitions were “deficient in some fundamental 
way.”40 
 
33 Id. at 251 (citation omitted); see People v. Gardner, 771 N.E.2d 26, 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002). 
34 Bryson, supra note 16, at 251. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Ill. 2009); Bryson, supra note 16, at 251. 
38 Bryson, supra note 16, at 251; see People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004); 
see also Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 947. 
39 Morgan, 817 N.E.2d at 527; People v. Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d 609, 620–21 (Ill. 
2002); Bryson, supra note 16, at 251. 
40 Bryson, supra note 16, at 251 (citing People v. Flores, 606 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Ill. 
1992)); see Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d at 621.  The test is intended to limit successive and 
frivolous postconviction petitions.  See Bryson, supra note 16, at 251 (citing Flores, 606 
N.E.2d at 1083).  “In pursuit of the latter objective, the legislature has also seen fit to enact 
section 22–105 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” People v. Tidwell, 923 N.E.2d 728, 732 (Ill. 
2010), which is intended “to curb the large number of frivolous collateral pleadings filed by 
prisoners which adversely affect the efficient administration of justice, and to compensate 
the courts for the time and expense incurred in processing and disposing of them,” People v. 
Conick, 902 N.E.2d 637, 643 (Ill. 2008).  To satisfy the cause and prejudice test, the 
petitioner must demonstrate to the court that an “external factor impeded efforts to raise the 
claim in the initial post-conviction proceeding (cause) and that application of waiver would 
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The petitioner can bypass the cause and prejudice test if he can make a 
showing of actual innocence.41  To do so, the petitioner must show newly 
discovered evidence that is material and noncumulative.42  Evidence found 
postconviction that could not have been discovered earlier with the exercise 
of due diligence is considered to be newly discovered.43  Evidence is 
cumulative when it does not add anything to what has already been 
presented to the jury.44  Prior to Edwards, the new evidence had to be “of 
such a conclusive character that it would probably change the result of 
retrial.”45 
This standard was developed considerably in Ortiz, a successive 
postconviction petition case at the Act’s third stage.46  In Ortiz, petitioner 
“Salvador Ortiz was convicted of first degree murder after a bench trial and 
sentenced to 47 years in prison.”47  The conviction relied heavily on the 
eyewitness accounts of Christopher Estavia and Edwin Villariny, despite 
the fact that both witnesses later recanted their statements to the police prior 
to trial.48  The trial judge found that the forensic and ballistic evidence 
corroborated Estavia’s and Villariny’s original statements to the police.49 
 
deny the petitioner consideration of an error that ‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting 
conviction or sentence violates due process’ (prejudice).”  Bryson, supra note 16, at 251 
(quoting Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d at 624). 
41 Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d at 621. 
42 People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336 (Ill. 1996); see Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 
950; Morgan, 817 N.E.2d at 527. 
43 Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 950.  In Ortiz, a previously unknown witness to the crime came 
forward to the defendant’s mother ten years after the trial.  Due to the witness’s location 
during the crime, it would have been impossible for the defendant to have seen him.  
Furthermore, the witness made himself unavailable by moving to Wisconsin shortly after the 
murder.  Thus, the court held the man to be a new witness.  Id. 
44 People v. Molstad, 461 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ill. 1984) (explaining that evidence might 
not be cumulative if it “goes to an ultimate issue in the case”); see also Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 
951 (“Hernandez’s testimony supplied a first-person account of the incident that directly 
contradicted the prior statements of the two eyewitnesses for the prosecution.  This 
testimony was not merely cumulative to Dunlam’s testimony supporting defendant’s alibi 
defense, or to Estavia’s and Villariny’s recantations of their prior statements.  Rather, it 
added to what was before the fact finder.”).  Evidence that would merely impeach a 
witness’s credibility is not considered material and noncumulative.  See People v. Smith, 685 
N.E.2d 880, 892–93 (Ill. 1997). 
45 People v. Harris, 794 N.E.2d 181, 188 (Ill. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Ortiz, 
919 N.E.2d at 950 (quoting Morgan, 817 N.E.2d at 527). 
46 Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941. 
47 Id. at 943. 
48 Id. at 943–44. 
49 Id. at 944–45. 
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In his third postconviction petition, rewritten by his attorneys,50 Ortiz 
based his actual innocence claim on the new eyewitness testimonies of 
Sigfredo Hernandez, Daniel Huertas, and Victor Ocasio.51  In affidavits, 
Huertas and Hernandez claimed to have witnessed three other people—not 
the defendant—beat and shoot the victim.52  They stated that they did not 
see Ortiz at the crime scene.53  Ocasio claimed to have witnessed the crime 
from a pay phone and did not mention seeing Ortiz.54 
The trial court denied Ortiz’s third successive postconviction petition 
for a retrial after the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing in stage three, 
finding that the eyewitness testimony was cumulative and did not meet the 
required standard for newly discovered evidence for an actual innocence 
claim.55  The appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded the case 
for a new trial, and the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the appellate court.56  
The Illinois Supreme Court held the eyewitness testimonies constituted 
newly discovered evidence because the two eyewitnesses were previously 
unknown to the petitioner.57  To determine whether to grant a new trial, the 
court considered “whether the evidence offered by [the petitioner] ‘is of 
such a conclusive character that it would probably change the result of 
retrial.’”58  The court explained that the new evidence would strengthen the 
petitioner’s claim of innocence at retrial when weighed against the 
conflicting eyewitness accounts.59  However, the court restated that “this 
does not mean that [the petitioner] is innocent, merely that all of the facts 
and surrounding circumstances, including the testimony of [the petitioner’s 
 
50 Id. at 945.  Ortiz filed a pro se postconviction petition on February 17, 2004, and his 




54 Id.  Ocasio’s affidavit had also been presented in Ortiz’s second postconviction 
petition.  Id. 
55 Id. at 946. 
56 Id. at 943. 
57 Id. at 95051. 
58 Id. at 951 (quoting People v. Harris, 794 N.E.2d 181, 188 (Ill. 2002)). 
59 Id. at 952 (citing People v. Molstad, 461 N.E.2d 398, 40102 (Ill. 1984)) (“Thus, at 
retrial, the evidence of defendant’s innocence would be stronger when weighed against the 
recanted statements of the State’s eyewitnesses.  The fact finder will be charged with 
determining the credibility of the witnesses in light of the newly discovered evidence and 
with balancing the conflicting eyewitness accounts.”).  Molstad involved a case of actual 
innocence on direct appeal rather than in a postconviction petition.  Molstad, 461 N.E.2d at 
400.  Nevertheless, the court adopted the same standard for new evidence in postconviction 
petitions as on direct appeal.  Id. at 40102. 
2014] LOSING OUR INNOCENCE 203 
witnesses], should be scrutinized more closely to determine the guilt or 
innocence of [the petitioner].”60 
In Illinois courts, the Ortiz standard—applied in conjunction with the 
appropriate evidentiary standard—remained the test to determine whether to 
grant leave to file successive postconviction petitions or to allow petitions 
to continue to subsequent stages up until the Illinois Supreme Court decided 
Edwards.61 
B. THE FEDERAL HABEAS ACTUAL INNOCENCE GATEWAY STANDARD 
Understanding federal actual innocence law is crucial to understanding 
Illinois actual innocence cases.  The following sections explain the federal 
standards set forth in Herra v. Collins and Schlup v. Delo.  
1. Herrera v. Collins  
The U.S. Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins rejected actual 
innocence as a substantive due process claim, insisting that “[c]laims of 
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held 
to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent 
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal 
proceeding.”62  However, the Court did not bar actual innocence claims 
entirely.  Rather, the Court acknowledged that if a “proper showing of 
actual innocence” is made such that it would be a “fundamental miscarriage 
of justice” not to hear the claim, the Court could make an exception.63  The 
Court also acknowledged that “a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a 
constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas 
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim 
considered on the merits.”64  Thus, in federal habeas cases, a habeas petition 
that is barred for whatever reason—such as when the state court rejects a 
petitioner’s claim on procedural grounds65 or the petitioner fails to bring the 
 
60 Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 952 (quoting Molstad, 461 N.E.2d at 402) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
61 See People v. Anderson, 929 N.E.2d 1206, 121112 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); People v. 
Gillespie, 941 N.E.2d 441, 460 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  For example, when deciding whether 
the petitioner passes the first stage of the Act, Illinois courts take the facts pleaded as true 
and apply the Ortiz standard—whether the newly discovered, material, noncumulative 
evidence “is of such a conclusive character that it would probably change the result of 
retrial”—to those facts.  Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 951; see, e.g., People v. Parker, 975 N.E.2d 78, 
91–93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), appeal denied, 979 N.E.2d 885 (Ill. 2012). 
62 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). 
63 Id. at 404. 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011). 
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claim on direct review66—may be allowed if the petitioner makes an actual 
innocence claim coupled with a claim alleging an independent 
constitutional procedural error.67  The actual innocence claim opens the 
door for a court to examine an otherwise barred freestanding constitutional 
violation.  The actual innocence claim thus acts as a “gateway” to the rest of 
the formerly prohibited claim.  Schlup v. Delo, decided shortly after 
Herrera, created the federal standard for actual innocence gateway claims.  
Schlup, discussed below, provides insight into the meaning of Edwards. 
 2. Schlup v. Delo 
The U.S. Supreme Court decided Schlup two years after Herrera.68  
The petitioner, Schlup, was convicted of murdering a fellow prison inmate 
and sentenced to death.69  After exhausting his state remedies on direct and 
collateral review, Schlup filed a pro se habeas petition alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to call witnesses who could 
establish his innocence.70  The district court found his claim to be 
procedurally barred, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court based 
on its own examination of the record, determining that Schlup’s counsel 
had not been ineffective.71  With new counsel, Schlup filed a second federal 
habeas petition alleging that he was actually innocent and that his execution 
would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.72  He also alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level and that the State had 
committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence.73  
Several affidavits were included with his petition.74  After the case worked 
its way through the district court and court of appeals, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.75 
The Supreme Court distinguished Schlup from Herrera.76  The 
majority claimed that Schlup’s innocence claim was procedural, rather than 
substantive, because his claim relied not on his innocence but on ineffective 
 
66 See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). 
67 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404–05. 
68 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 
69 Id. at 30105. 
70 Id. at 306. 
71 Id. at 30607. 
72 Id. at 307. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 30613. 
76 Id. at 31317. 
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counsel and the prosecution’s Brady violation.77  The Court found that 
Schlup could obtain review of his procedurally barred petition if his case 
fell within “the narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice” mentioned in Herrera.78  The Court found that it 
would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice to refuse to hear the 
procedurally barred claim assuming Schlup could demonstrate actual 
innocence.79  Essentially, the Court found that Schlup’s claim of actual 
innocence could act as a gateway to his procedurally barred habeas 
petition.80  Furthermore, because Schlup’s innocence claim constituted a 
gateway claim, his burden to prove his innocence claim was lower than that 
for Herrera, who based his claim purely on substantive due process.81 
It is important to note the Court’s lengthy discussion of the standards 
set forth in two previous decisions, Sawyer v. Whitley82 and Murray v. 
Carrier.83  The Sawyer and Carrier standards are two different standards of 
proof that the Supreme Court uses in habeas cases.84  The Sawyer standard, 
the more stringent of the two standards of proof, “was fashioned to reflect 
the relative importance of a claim of an erroneous sentence.”85  Under the 
Sawyer standard, a petitioner “must show by clear and convincing evidence 
that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the 
petitioner eligible for the death penalty.”86  The less stringent Carrier 
standard was created for the “extraordinary case[] where a constitutional 
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 
innocent.”87  To satisfy the Carrier standard, a petitioner must “show that it 
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [him] 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”88 
 
77 Id. at 314.  Herrera brought a Brady violation claim in his successive petition, but the 
court of appeals, affirming the district court’s determination, dismissed it for lack of 
evidentiary basis.  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 397 (1993).  For an explanation of 
Brady violations, see supra note 28. 
78 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314–15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McCleskey v. 
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 315 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404). 
81 Id. at 31516. 
82 505 U.S. 333 (1992). 
83 477 U.S. 478 (1986). 
84 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 320. 
85 Id. at 325. 
86 Id. at 323 (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992)).  The Court also 
remarked that the court of appeals misapplied the Sawyer standard.  Id.  However, since the 
Court did not think the Sawyer standard, correctly or incorrectly applied, should be used at 
all, the Court did not discuss the error further.  Id. at 32324. 
87 Id. at 321 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
88 Id. at 327. 
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In Schlup, the Supreme Court ultimately decided that the Carrier 
standard was the more appropriate of the two, overruling the Eighth Circuit, 
which had applied the Sawyer standard.89  The Court emphasized the 
difference between the two standards: the Sawyer standard applies to cases 
where the petitioner claims that he is ineligible for the death penalty but 
does not claim to be innocent of the crime, whereas the Carrier standard 
applies where the petitioner claims that he is actually innocent of the entire 
crime of which he was convicted.90  According to the Court in Schlup, 
because the correct analysis in actual innocence gateway cases seeks to 
“balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce 
judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that arises in the 
extraordinary case,” the Carrier standard is most appropriate.91 
Applying the Carrier standard, the Court held that where the petitioner 
uses actual innocence as the means for the federal court to examine an 
otherwise procedurally barred freestanding constitutional violation, a 
petitioner must “show that it is more likely than not that ‘no reasonable 
juror’ would have convicted him.”92  The Court stated that at trial a 
“reasonable juror would consider fairly all of the evidence presented.”93  
Therefore, “the habeas court must consider what reasonable triers of fact are 
likely to do.”94  The Court called it a probability standard; however, this 
standard is stringent and extremely difficult to meet.95 
Herrera and Schlup demonstrate the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance 
to recognize actual innocence claims.  First, in Herrera, the Court rejected 
actual innocence as a substantive due process claim under the Constitution.  
In Schlup, the Court recognized actual innocence as a gateway to otherwise 
procedurally barred claims, but set the bar to win a retrial very high.  The 
test, a probability test based on the Carrier standard, requires petitioners to 
“show that it is more likely than not that ‘no reasonable juror’ would have 
convicted him.”96 
 
89 Id. at 32527. 
90 Id. at 32223. 
91 Id. at 324. 
92 Id. at 329. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 330. 
95 See id.; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522 (2006).  Bell, the only actual 
innocence gateway habeas petition heard by the U.S. Supreme Court since Schlup, 
demonstrates the extensive amount of new evidence necessary to meet the Schlup standard.  
The Court granted Paul Gregory House’s habeas petition based on new DNA evidence, other 
forensic evidence, and a new suspect.  Id. at 54041, 548.  “After careful review of the full 
record, we conclude that House has made the stringent showing required by this exception; 
and we hold that his federal habeas action may proceed.”  Id. at 522. 
96 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. 
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The federal standard for actual innocence gateway claims is difficult to 
meet and is not petitioner friendly.97 
C. THE PROBLEM OF PEOPLE V. EDWARDS 
It is with these cases in mind—Hererra, Schlup, Washington, and 
Ortiz—that Edwards must be understood.  The Illinois Supreme Court 
decided Edwards in April 2012.98  Edwards, the petitioner, was convicted of 
first-degree murder under a theory of accountability and was sentenced to 
twenty-eight years in prison.99  Only Edwards’s own statements linked him 
to the crime scene.100  None of the State’s eyewitnesses or physical 
evidence placed Edwards at the scene of the crime.101  Edwards was only 
fifteen years old at the time of the murder.102 
In total, Edwards filed four successive postconviction petitions, and 
this case derived from his appeal of the denial of his third and fourth 
successive postconviction petitions, which included claims of actual 
innocence.103  In his third petition, Edwards presented newly discovered 
evidence in the form of affidavits.104  One affidavit submitted by witness 
Eddie Coleman stated that he, along with Willie Richards and “Little 
Mikey,” committed the murder and that Edwards “had nothing to do with 
this shooting.”105  Coleman said he failed to come forward earlier out of 
fear of self-incrimination.106  In his fourth petition, Edwards presented alibi 
affidavits from Dominique and Kathleen Coleman, stating that Edwards had 
 
97 See id.; see also Bell, 547 U.S. at 522. 
98 People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829 (Ill. 2012). 
99 Id. at 832.  Convictions based on a theory of accountability are particularly difficult to 
overcome in postconviction actual innocence petitions because a person convicted under a 
theory of accountability was convicted not based on the commission of the final act but 
rather when: 
(a) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or she causes another to 
perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a 
mental state; 
(b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her so accountable; or 
(c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or 
facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other 
person in the planning or commission of the offense. 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2 (Supp. 2013). 




104 Id. at 833. 
105 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106 Id. 
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been “with them in their residence before, during, and after the shooting 
took place.”107  Dominique explained that she did not present this evidence 
earlier because she was a minor and her mother, Kathleen, forbade her from 
coming forward.108  Kathleen stated in her affidavit that she was afraid to 
get involved in the case because of its serious nature and because several of 
her family members were allegedly involved in the crime.109  She stated that 
she had refused to testify or to allow her daughter Dominique to testify 
despite numerous requests by Edwards’s counsel and had repeatedly been 
uncooperative since Edwards’s incarceration.110  On appeal, the two 
petitions were consolidated and both were denied.111 
The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by reiterating that the 
Act only contemplates one petition, but that a court may allow successive 
petitions in one of two ways: either the petitioner must meet the cause and 
prejudice test or, if the petitioner claims actual innocence, he must meet the 
more relaxed standard of “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”112  The court 
cited Ortiz for the proposition that the relaxed bar for actual innocence is a 
judge-made exception.113  At this point, the court turned away from its usual 
analysis.  Instead of citing Ortiz and determining whether Edwards had 
presented “newly discovered evidence” that would “probably change the 
result on retrial,” the court stated the standard as follows: “[W]e hold today 
that leave of court should be denied only where it is clear, from a review of 
the successive petition and the documentation provided by the petitioner 
that, as a matter of law, the petitioner cannot set forth a colorable claim of 
actual innocence.”114  The court then restated the standard but varied its 
language.  In its second articulation of the holding the court wrote: “Stated 
differently, leave of court should be granted when the petitioner’s 
supporting documentation raises the probability that ‘it is more likely than 
not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 
new evidence.’”115  Despite its claim that the second articulation of the 
holding is merely a restatement of the first, the second holding’s use of very 
different language suggests otherwise.  
 
107 Id. at 833–34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
108 Id. at 834. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id.  Interestingly, Justice Charles Freeman, the same justice who wrote the majority 
opinion in People v. Washington, authored the opinion in this case. 
112 Id. at 835–36. 
113 Id. at 836. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). 
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Adding to the confusion, the court relied on conflicting case law to 
support the two different holdings.  To support its first holding,  the court 
cited People v. Smith, an Illinois case predating Ortiz.116  Smith cited 
Sawyer, the federal habeas case, for the proposition that a petitioner must 
provide enough documentation to set forth a colorable claim of actual 
innocence.117  Sawyer is the same case the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in 
Schlup for creating too high a standard under which to evaluate 
postconviction actual innocence gateway claims.  But when restating the 
holding, the Edwards court cited and quoted Schlup.  Thus, in an attempt to 
clarify its holding, the Edwards court used conflicting Supreme Court 
precedent. 
The court also noted that, according to the Act’s legislative history, the 
Act was intended to be consistent with federal law insofar as the Act was 
intended to only allow one postconviction petition.118  The court stated that 
the Illinois Act “disfavor[s]” successive postconviction petitions, noting 
that it was intended to be consistent with federal law’s prohibition of 
multiple habeas petitions and thus only allows one postconviction 
petition.119  Therefore, the court reasoned, the legislative history “clearly 
support[s] our conclusion that the ‘colorable claim of actual innocence’ 
standard should apply” to successive postconviction actual innocence 
petitions.120  As a result, the court rejected the petitioner’s argument that 
successive petitions should be read with the same standard as first-time 
petitions.121 
The Edwards court also added an element from federal law to the 
“newly discovered” evidence standard in Illinois actual innocence claims.122  
In addition to the requirement that evidence of actual innocence be newly 
discovered, material, and not merely cumulative, the court stated that the 
evidence must also be reliable.123  Here, the Illinois Supreme Court openly 
acknowledged its reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in 
Schlup.124 
Applying the standard created earlier in the opinion as well as the new 
reliability requirement to Edwards, the court concluded that Edwards did 
 
116 Id. (citing People v. Smith, 794 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
117 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339–40 (1992) (defining actual innocence in 
the context of federal habeas petitions as a colorable claim of factual innocence). 
118 Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 837. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 837–38. 
122 Id. at 838. 
123 Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). 
124 Id. 
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not “set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence,” nor stated the other 
way, did he “raise the probability that it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.”125 
II. ANALYSIS 
Edwards has created confusion about what the exact standard is in 
Illinois for granting successive postconviction actual innocence petitions.  
Despite the confusion caused by the Edwards court’s two holdings and 
conflicting use of precedent, the case establishes a higher standard for 
petitioners filing successive postconviction petitions of actual innocence.  
This higher standard is evidenced by the language of the opinion and the 
continued use of federal precedent, and has been bolstered by the lower 
courts’ interpretations of the Edwards standard.  To begin that discussion, I 
will first untangle the text of the case.  I will then turn to the lower courts’ 
interpretations of Edwards in recent cases. 
A. LANGUAGE PROBLEMS AND CONFUSION IN PEOPLE V. EDWARDS 
The holding in Edwards is stated in two conflicting ways.  The court’s 
first iteration of the holding states: 
With respect to those seeking to relax the bar against successive postconviction 
petitions on the basis of actual innocence, we hold today that leave of court should be 
denied only where it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the 
documentation provided by the petitioner that, as a matter of law, the petitioner cannot 
set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence.126 
From this statement, it appears that the standard for filing postconviction 
petitions rests on the term “colorable claim of actual innocence.”  The term 
“colorable” suggests a standard based on probability or reasonable chance.  
In other words, a “colorable claim of actual innocence” would be a claim 
for which there is a reasonable chance that the petitioner is innocent.  
However, immediately following the first articulation of the holding, the 
court wrote: “Stated differently, leave of court should be granted when the 
petitioner’s supporting documentation raises the probability that ‘it is more 
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the 
light of the new evidence.’”127 
This second statement of the holding reads very differently from the 
first iteration and is internally contradictory.  The first part of the second 
statement of the holding, which reads, “raises the probability that it is more 
 
125 See id. at 837–38. 
126 Id. at 836 (internal citations omitted) (citing People v. Smith, 794 N.E.2d 367, 374 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003)). 
127 Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 
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likely than not,” echoes the first statement of the holding and its focus on 
probability.  However, the court then explains that the documentation must 
demonstrate that there is no doubt of the petitioner’s innocence because “no 
reasonable juror” would have convicted the petitioner had this new 
evidence been presented.  The mixture of “no reasonable juror” with the 
probability standard is confusing because readers cannot discern which part 
of the holding is more important.  On one hand, taken with the first 
statement of the holding, the suggestion of weighing probability seems 
more important than the certainty that “no juror” would convict the 
defendant on retrial.  On the other hand, “no reasonable juror” is very 
strong language and cannot be ignored. 
Compounding the confusion, the court also relied upon conflicting 
precedent.  Immediately before stating the two contradictory versions of the 
holding, the court cited Ortiz to support the idea that showing actual 
innocence relaxes the bar against successive petitions.128  The court also 
cited Ortiz and Washington when it defined the elements of actual 
innocence: “The elements of a claim of actual innocence are that the 
evidence in support of the claim must be ‘newly discovered’; material and 
not merely cumulative; and of such conclusive character that it would 
probably change the result on retrial.”129  Thus, the court used the Ortiz 
probability standard in parts of the opinion.  However, after reviewing the 
new evidence presented by Edwards, the court found that “it does not raise 
the probability that, in light of the new evidence, it is more likely than not 
that no reasonable juror would have convicted petitioner.”130  Immediately 
following that statement, the court found that “[t]his evidence is not ‘of 
such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on 
retrial.’”131 
In addition to citing Ortiz, the court also cited several federal habeas 
cases to support its reasoning.  In the first statement of the holding, the 
court cited Sawyer;132 yet, in the second statement of the holding the court 
cited Schlup.133  These citations are highly problematic because, as noted 
earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court in Schlup blatantly rejected the Sawyer 
standard in the actual innocence context as too stringent.134  Furthermore, 
Sawyer addressed an erroneous sentence claim whereas Schlup specifically 
 
128 Id. at 835–36 (citing People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 950 (Ill. 2009)). 
129 Id. at 838 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
130 Id. at 839 (emphasis added). 
131 Id. (quoting People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004)). 
132 Id. at 836 (citing People v. Smith, 794 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), which 
cited and adopted Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)). 
133 Id. (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). 
134 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325–26. 
212 VANESSA J. SZALAPSKI [Vol. 104 
addressed a claim of actual innocence.135  Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court 
not only mixed federal law with Illinois law but also failed to correctly cite 
federal actual innocence law.136  Furthermore, as discussed in Part II.B, the 
federal standard, even under Schlup, is incredibly difficult to meet, in part 
because the U.S. Supreme Court relies on state courts to adjudicate actual 
innocence claims.137  This use of federal law in conjunction with Ortiz and 
other Illinois law only compounds the confusion. 
Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court’s use of federal law in other 
areas of the opinion suggests that the court intended to make the Illinois 
standard parallel the federal standard.  First, the Illinois Supreme Court 
added an element, reliability, to the actual innocence claim directly from 
Schlup, openly acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court as its source.138  
Second, when discussing whether to make the standard for successive 
petitions the same as that for first petitions, the court cited the Act’s 
legislative history in which a state senator remarked that allowing one 
petition under the Illinois Act would make the Act consistent with federal 
law.139  The court found these remarks sufficient to support its conclusion 
that the first-stage analysis did not apply to successive petitions and that the 
“colorable claim of actual innocence” standard should apply instead, 
because federal habeas actual innocence gateway cases employ the 
“colorable claim of actual innocence” language.140 
Despite the many textual contradictions, it appears the court intended 
to strengthen the requirements to get leave of court to file a successive 
petition.141  While the court held onto some of the language from Ortiz, the 
 
135 Id. at 325 (“Though the Sawyer standard was fashioned to reflect the relative 
importance of a claim of an erroneous sentence, application of that standard to petitioners 
such as Schlup would give insufficient weight to the correspondingly greater injustice that is 
implicated by a claim of actual innocence.”). 
136 Of course, the Illinois Supreme Court is not required to follow the federal actual 
innocence standard.  However, it is odd that the court should reject the federal standard in 
Washington for being too strict only to later cite federal law in a subsequent case, written by 
the same justice (Justice Freeman).  The Illinois Supreme Court’s use of federal law is even 
more confusing considering that the federal law the Illinois Supreme Court cites was rejected 
by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too strict. 
137 See supra Part I.B. 
138 Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 838 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 
139 Id. at 837. 
140 Id. 
141 In an opinion released October 3, 2013, the Illinois Supreme Court states that 
Edwards did not change the actual innocence standard.  See People v. Coleman, No. 113307, 
2013 WL 5488934, ¶ 93 (Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).  However, this statement is unfounded for the 
reasons stated above (including Edwards’s contradictory language, reliance on federal law, 
and addition of a new reliability requirement taken directly from federal law).  Furthermore, 
the Coleman opinion dealt with a first-time petition at the third stage of the Act, not a 
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court’s insistence on following each statement with language and citations 
from federal cases, even if those citations were poorly applied, 
demonstrates the court’s desire to create a higher bar for granting leave to 
file successive postconviction actual innocence petitions.  Regardless of 
which federal standard is used, Schlup or Sawyer, Edwards raised the bar 
for obtaining leave of court to file;142  choosing between Schlup and Sawyer 
only changes the degree to which the bar has been raised.143  Furthermore, 
adding Schlup’s reliability requirement and rejecting the first-stage analysis 
in successive petitions clarifies the court’s intent.  Despite the fact that the 
Edwards opinion was written by the same justice who so vehemently 
rejected Herrera in Washington,144 the court changed the Illinois successive 
actual innocence petitions standard to more closely parallel the federal 
actual innocence gateway standard. 
B. EDWARDS’S IMPACT FOR PETITIONERS SEEKING LEAVE OF COURT 
The lower courts’ decisions are the true indicator of whether, in 
practice, Edwards changed the standard for granting leave to file successive 
postconviction actual innocence petitions.  Since the Edwards decision, the 
lower appellate courts have decided several cases using the Edwards 
standard.  Interestingly, most of the opinions are unpublished, and of the 
roughly thirty-five successive postconviction actual innocence petitions that 
were decided by October 1, 2013, thirty-four of them were denied by the 
court of appeals.  One of those denials was overturned by the Illinois 
Supreme Court, and one petition was granted by a court of appeals.145  
 
successive petition seeking leave of court to file.  Id. ¶ 98.  Additionally, it would not be the 
first time a court has said one thing and done another.  See, e.g., John E. Kennedy, Federal 
Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the 
Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REV. LITIG. 227, 229–30 (1987) (“The Celotex Court 
rejected that interpretation of Adickes, in the process explicitly approving the Adickes ruling 
handed down some sixteen years earlier.  Although Celotex and its progeny do not purport to 
establish new law with respect to Rule 56, taken together they do signal a significant change 
in attitude toward grants of summary judgment.”). 
142 Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 837; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538–53 (2006) 
(explaining the application of the “no reasonable juror” standard under Schlup and Sawyer as 
applied to various types of new evidence a jury had not had available to consider in a case). 
143 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324–27. 
144 People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1335–36 (Ill. 1996) (“[W]e labor under no 
self-imposed constraint to follow federal precedent in ‘lockstep’ in defining Illinois’ due 
process protection. . . .  We believe so as a matter of both procedural and substantive due 
process.  In terms of procedural due process, we believe that to ignore such a claim would be 
fundamentally unfair.” (citations omitted)). 
145 People v. Bruce, No. 1-09-3401, 2012 WL 6936105 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012), 
vacated, 978 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. 2012); see also People v. Adams, No. 1-11-1081, 2013 WL 
4516943 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 23, 2013). 
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The cases decided by the Illinois appellate courts after Edwards 
demonstrate that Edwards created a more stringent standard for successive 
petitions.  In some cases, the petitions failed under the Ortiz standard, and 
Edwards did not affect the decisions.146  But Edwards had a notable effect 
in several other cases where the appellate courts used the new reliability 
requirement to dismiss successive petitions.147  The following Sections 
provide examples of (1) cases unaffected by Edwards; (2) cases that 
demonstrate Edwards’s stricter standard; and (3) cases where Edwards’s 
new reliability requirement raised the petitioners’ burden. 
1. Cases Unaffected by Edwards 
As one example, Edwards had little effect on the outcome in People v. 
Spencer.148  The defendant, Robert Spencer, was found guilty on a theory of 
accountability,149 a difficult charge to collaterally attack.150  Spencer’s claim 
of innocence was based on the fact that police did not find his blood on 
stereo equipment taken from the scene of the crime.151  However, because 
the defendant was convicted on a theory of accountability, the absence of 
his blood could not exculpate him.152  Thus, the court’s decision in Spencer 
sheds little light on the full impact of Edwards. 
In People v. Tellez, another case where Edwards had little effect, the 
court denied the prisoner’s successive petition because the new evidence 
from a 60 Minutes investigative report on bullet lead analysis “would have 
no discernible impact on the result of defendant’s trial if there were further 
proceedings under the Act.”153  Even if the new evidence were accepted as 
true, the court stated, all of the other evidence previously used at trial would 
 
146 See, e.g., People v. Brown, No. 1-09-2597, 2012 WL 6859503 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 21, 
2012); People v. Hanible, Nos. 1-10-1537, 1-10-2400, 2012 WL 6950244 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 
19, 2012); People v. Glinsey, No. 1-09-0608, 2012 WL 6934896 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 5, 
2012); People v. Tellez, No. 1-10-1272, 2012 WL 6950176 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012); 
People v. Spencer, No. 1-09-0105, 2012 WL 6934890 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 6, 2012). 
147 See, e.g., People v. Garcia-Sandoval, Nos. 1-11-2215, 1-11-3763, 2013 WL 1289148 
(Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2013); People v. Strong, No. 2-10-1012, 2012 WL 6965370 (Ill. App. 
Ct. Sept. 26, 2012); People v. Register, No. 3-10-0038, 2012 WL 6968363 (Ill. App. Ct. May 
22, 2012). 
148 2012 WL 6934890. 
149 Id. at *1. 
150 See People v. Anderson, 929 N.E.2d 1206, 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); see also 
discussion supra note 99 (describing convictions founded upon theories of accountability). 
151 Spencer, 2012 WL 6934890, at *4. 
152 Id.  The trier of fact may use the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime as 
evidence supporting a theory of accountability.  See discussion supra note 99.  Thus, it is 
very difficult for a prisoner to prove actual innocence when he is convicted on a theory of 
accountability. 
153 No. 1-10-1272, 2012 WL 6950176, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012). 
2014] LOSING OUR INNOCENCE 215 
overwhelm the new evidence.154  The court pointed to three pieces of 
evidence used at trial that could not be overcome by new evidence: (1) two 
recorded conversations in which the petitioner had admitted his guilt; (2) 
two acquaintances who stated that the petitioner had asked them to falsely 
testify on his behalf at trial; and (3) police officers who testified as to the 
type of gun the defendant used.155  As the court aptly explained it, the 
forensics used in the case were far from the “l[i]nchpin” of the case against 
the defendant, so the new contradictory evidence did little to undermine the 
case against him.156  Indeed, it appears that the prosecution had a solid case 
against the petitioner and the court could dismiss the petition under Ortiz. 
2. Cases Demonstrating Edwards’s Stricter Standard 
In other cases, Edwards functioned to create a stricter standard, even if 
the courts did not explicitly acknowledge the change.  In People v. Glinsey, 
the court appeared to argue that Edwards did not change the standard.157  In 
actuality, the court’s analysis demonstrates that the Edwards standard was 
indeed stricter.158  The court reiterated the four requirements from Ortiz that 
petitioners must satisfy to establish newly discovered evidence of actual 
innocence.159  However, the court used the Edwards holding (“‘does not 
raise the probability that, in light of this new evidence, it is more likely than 
not that no reasonable juror would have convicted’ [the] defendant”160) to 
determine whether the fourth Ortiz element (“would probably change the 
result upon retrial”) had been met.161  The court stated that while the new 
evidence—in the form of a recantation—would be enough to assert a 
“reasonable doubt argument,” it was not “so conclusive that it would 
change the result at trial.”162  The court omitted the word “probably” and 
just stated, “would change the result at trial.”163  Thus, the appellate court 
interpreted the Edwards standard to require that the result would change 




156 Id. at *4. 
157 No. 1-09-0608, 2012 WL 6934896 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 5, 2012). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at *4. 
160 Id. (quoting People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 839 (Ill. 2012)). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at *5. 
163 Id. 
216 VANESSA J. SZALAPSKI [Vol. 104 
3. Cases Adding Edwards’s Reliability Requirement  
The new element of reliability is proving to be a strong barrier to 
granting leave to file successive petitions.164  In People v. Register, the 
court began its analysis with the Ortiz standard.165  The court found that the 
evidence offered in the petition was not newly discovered; rather, the 
evidence was cumulative and “was not ‘of such conclusive character that it 
would likely change the result on retrial.’”166  The court stated that the 
defendant knew about the witnesses prior to his trial, therefore their 
statements were not new.167  Furthermore, the “new” witnesses’ statements 
did not differ from those statements already proffered at trial and “would 
not necessarily impeach the credibility of the State’s principal witness.”168  
The court addressed the possibility of newly discovered evidence taking the 
form of a witness recantation as well.169  Here, quoting Edwards, the court 
stated that new evidence of actual innocence must be reliable.170  Because 
the witness demonstrated uncertainty about the timing of his statements and 
was not recanting his prior testimony, the court found that this new 
evidence was not reliable.171  This finding is a sharp departure from the 
reasoning in People v. Lofton, in which the court made it clear that the 
credibility of the witness was to be determined at the evidentiary hearing 
and not when determining whether to grant a successive petition.172 
People v. Strong demonstrates a more stringent standard as well.173  
First, like the court in Register, the Strong court adopted the reliability 
requirement for newly discovered evidence.174  In Strong, the court stated 
that the recanted testimony was neither newly discovered nor reliable.175  
 
164 See, e.g., People v. Garcia-Sandoval, Nos. 1-11-2215, 1-11-3763, 2013 WL 1289148 
(Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2013); People v. Strong, No. 2-10-1012, 2012 WL 6965370 (Ill. App. 
Ct. Sept. 26, 2012); People v. Register, No. 3-10-0038, 2012 WL 6968363 (Ill. App. Ct. May 
22, 2012). 
165 Register, 2012 WL 6968363, at *1 (citing Edwards but using the language from 
Ortiz). 
166 Id. at *2 (quoting People v. Smith, 685 N.E.2d 880, 893 (1997)).  Interestingly, the 
Register court used the manifestly erroneous standard on review.  Id. at *1.  Other courts 
used a de novo standard.  See, e.g., Garcia-Sandoval, 2013 WL 1289148; Strong, 2012 WL 
6965370. 
167 Register, 2012 WL 6968363, at *2. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at *3. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 People v. Lofton, 954 N.E.2d 821, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that credibility is 
to be determined at the third stage evidentiary hearing and not at earlier stages). 
173 People v. Strong, No. 2-10-1012, 2012 WL 6965370 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 26, 2012). 
174 Id. at *6 (citing People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 838 (Ill. 2012)). 
175 Id. at *7. 
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Second, like the Glinsey court, the Strong court rejected the petition 
because it found that an alternate theory, which could create reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, did not satisfy the requirement that new 
evidence would make it “more likely than not that no reasonable juror 
would have convicted him.”176  The court stressed that the standard is “no 
reasonable juror.”177  Thus, the Strong court interpreted the Edwards 
standard as requiring a greater amount of certainty of a different outcome at 
retrial than merely the probability of a different outcome. 
In People v. Garcia-Sandoval the appellate court strongly emphasized 
the new reliability requirement as well.178  The court’s ultimate denial did 
not rely on the reliability of the new evidence;179 however, the court twice 
stated in two separate paragraphs of the opinion that the new evidence must 
be reliable, underscoring the importance of the requirement in the eyes of 
the appellate court.180 
The cases decided after Edwards reveal the wide spectrum of options 
available to courts when deciding whether to grant leave of court.  In some 
instances, the facts allowed the courts to rely only on Ortiz to dismiss the 
cases.181  Other times, courts read Edwards as abandoning the Ortiz 
probability standard in favor of a near certainty standard.182  The new 
reliability element equips the courts with a powerful tool to find the new 
evidence unreliable and deny leave to file successive petitions.183  It is clear 
that Edwards’s stricter standard makes it easier for courts to dismiss 
successive postconviction actual innocence petitions. 
III. POLICY 
As explained in Part II, Edwards created a more stringent standard.  
The cases decided since Edwards are not the end of the story, but they 
certainly indicate that the standard for successive postconviction actual 
innocence petitions is stricter than before.  Yet, it is important to examine 
whether a stricter standard for granting leave of court for successive 
 
176 Id. at *6 (citing Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 836). 
177 Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 
178 Nos. 1-11-2215, 1-11-3763, 2013 WL 1289148 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2013). 
179 Id. at *6. 
180 Id. at *4–5. 
181 See, e.g., People v. Tellez, No. 1-10-1272, 2012 WL 6950176, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Aug. 21, 2012); People v. Spencer, No. 1-09-0105, 2012 WL 6934890 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 6, 
2012). 
182 Strong, 2012 WL 6965370, at *7 (emphasizing that the Strong court would have 
affirmed the lower court’s determination unless “no reasonable juror” would have convicted 
the defendant, and thus affirming the lower court). 
183 See, e.g., Garcia-Sandoval, 2013 WL 1289148; Strong, 2012 WL 6965370; People v. 
Register, No. 3-10-0038, 2012 WL 6968363 (Ill. App. Ct. May 22, 2012). 
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postconviction actual innocence petitions is good for Illinois from a policy 
standpoint, given both the state of criminal law in Illinois, in which news of 
exonerations occurs regularly, and the purpose of the Act. 
Between 1989 and 2012, a staggering 311 DNA exonerations occurred 
in the United States.184  However, considering the number of criminal cases 
that do not have the benefit of DNA to scrutinize the validity of their 
convictions, there are likely hundreds more innocent people in prison.  
According to one study of 200 DNA exonerations, 79% of those wrongfully 
convicted had faulty eyewitness identifications at their trials.185  Other 
studies have demonstrated similarly appalling results.186  Thus, as Joshua 
Dressler and George Thomas aptly put it, “eyewitness misidentification is 
the single most common factor in wrongful convictions throughout the 
United States.”187  It can be inferred that hundreds of innocent men and 
women are in prison without the benefit of DNA evidence to exonerate 
them.  With these statistics in mind, a stricter standard for successive 
postconviction actual innocence petitions is unjust, especially given the 
truism that it would be better to let ten guilty defendants walk free than to 
convict one innocent person.188 
In People v. Washington, the Illinois Supreme Court took a 
monumental step by refusing to interpret the Illinois constitution in lockstep 
with the U.S. Constitution.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has even 
recognized that state criminal justice systems are the best forum for dealing 
with actual innocence petitions.189  One of the reasons for such a strict 
federal standard is, in the view of at least one Supreme Court Justice, that 
state courts are more appropriate and better equipped to handle actual 
 
184 DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/Qs0SP6 (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2013); see also Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 
87 WASH. L. REV. 139, 142 (2012). 
185 Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 60 (2008). 
186 See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005).  In the 340 exonerations between 1989 and 
2003, 64% of wrongful convictions included at least one eyewitness who had misidentified 
the defendant.  The percentage jumps to a staggering 90% in wrongful rape convictions.  Id. 
187 JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATING 
CRIME 764 (5th ed. 2013). 
188 Many scholars, including William Blackstone and Benjamin Franklin, have stated 
variations of this maxim.  See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *713 (“All 
presumptive evidence of felony should be admitted cautiously; for the law holds it better that 
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent party suffer.”); Letter from Benjamin 
Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: 
COLLECTED AND EDITED WITH A LIFE AND INTRODUCTION 291, 293 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 
1906) (“That it is better 100 guilty Persons should escape than that one innocent Person 
should suffer . . . .”). 
189 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1993). 
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innocence cases.190  Thus, the Supreme Court’s standard is extremely strict 
and difficult to meet precisely because the states are the main forum for 
innocence claims.  For Illinois to make it more difficult to obtain leave of 
court simply to file is therefore unjust.  Furthermore, of the pre-Edwards 
successive postconviction actual innocence petitions citing Ortiz, appellate 
courts have granted only two successive petitions.191  Ortiz was 
undoubtedly already strict enough, and there was no need for a stricter 
standard. 
Essentially, Edwards may require the petitioner to prove his case 
before getting to the first stage of the Act, rather than at a retrial, because 
the petition may proceed if and only if “no reasonable juror” would find the 
defendant guilty.192  If this language is read literally, the court is asking 
petitioners to prove their cases at the outset of the process, before any 
evidentiary hearing and without the benefit of live witnesses.  Today, with 
our modern understanding of trial procedures and wrongful convictions, it 
is evident that standards requiring near-certitude, such as DNA testing, do 
not adequately protect the innocent.193  Furthermore, if Edwards has indeed 
created a higher standard for granting leave to file successive 
postconviction actual innocence petitions, then the standard for granting 
leave of court to file a successive petition is at odds with the standard for 
stage three evidentiary hearings.  At stage three, the petitioner is held to the 
“probably change the result on retrial” standard.  What is the point of stage 
three if the petitioner already proved her case just to get leave to file? 
Edwards’s proponents may argue that the petitioner should have 
gotten it right on the first petition and should be grateful for the chance to 
submit successive petitions at all.  Edwards’s proponents may further argue 
that it is more difficult to put on and make a case in an evidentiary hearing 
than the earlier stages where the petitioner must simply supply 
documentation such as affidavits.  But this view is unreasonable, especially 
 
190 Id. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Instead, the Court assumes for the sake of 
argument that a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence would render any such 
execution unconstitutional and that federal habeas relief would be warranted if no state 
avenue were open to process the claim.”).  Thus, it appears that the Court’s reasoning relies, 
at least in part, on the idea that there is some avenue for relief in the state criminal system. 
191 See People v. Hill, No. 1-09-1657, 2011 WL 9692904 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 8, 2011); 
People v. Munoz, 941 N.E.2d 318, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  A Westlaw search revealed 
twenty-two successive postconviction actual innocence cases citing Ortiz.  Many of these 
postconviction petition cases are not published, making it difficult to know exactly how 
many are denied or granted.  Furthermore, cases involving DNA evidence are not included 
because those cases are not the subject of this Comment.  A second successive 
postconviction petition cites Ortiz at the third stage of the Act.  See People v. Lofton, 954 
N.E.2d 821, 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
192 People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Ill. 2012) (emphasis added). 
193 Smith, supra note 184, at 185. 
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considering who the petitioners are in these cases.  The petitioners are 
prisoners in the state system who have little or no legal knowledge, have in 
many cases very little schooling, and have very limited access to 
information.194  Some cases require further investigation to prove 
innocence, a challenging task from a prison cell.  Furthermore, first 
petitions are filed pro se more often than not.195  Legal assistance may come 
later, but often, it is too late.  With legal assistance, successive petitions are 
often stronger than the first one. 
In his recent article, Robert Smith disagreed with these assertions.196  
Smith does believe that postconviction actual innocence petitions are 
necessary for today’s criminal justice system in which trials are no longer 
the great exposer of innocence and guilt.197  For nonprocedurally defaulted 
claims, he proposes that petitioners must demonstrate their innocence by 
clear and convincing evidence.198  In other words, petitioners would have to 
prove that they are “highly probably innocent.”199  For gateway claims 
where innocence is used to get to otherwise procedurally defaulted claims, 
he proposes a lower standard of “reasonable probability of innocence.”200  
He finds the Washington standard, and by extension the Ortiz standard, to 
be too low, because it “does not adequately account for the societal interest 
in securing and maintaining convictions against those who do commit 
crimes,” and because some guilty people would walk free because the 
standard of proof is 51% chance the person is innocent.201  He argues that it 
would be unlikely that the state could retry the petitioner, and thus there is a 
significant risk to society.202 
However, Smith’s claims are unfounded.  Of the sixty-eight published 
cases in Illinois citing Washington as of October 1, 2013, only three 
petitioners were granted new trials, and one of those trials was granted due 
 
194 See Steven D. Hinckley, Bounds and Beyond: A Need to Reevaluate the Right of 
Prisoner Access to the Courts, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 19, 43 (1987) (“[O]ver thirty percent of 
all prisoners have less than an eighth grade education, as opposed to only nine percent with 
less than an eighth grade education among the general population.”); see also Johnson v. 
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969) (“Jails and penitentiaries include among their inmates a 
high percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose educational 
attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited.”); Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 
1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting a district court’s finding that Florida’s prison population 
had “more than [a] 50% rate of inmate functional illiteracy”). 
195 Bryson, supra note 16, at 249. 
196 Smith, supra note 184. 
197 Id. at 146–47. 
198 Id. at 204. 
199 Id. at 186 (citations omitted). 
200 Id. at 204. 
201 Id. at 186. 
202 Id. 
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to new DNA evidence.203  Thus, out of the sixty-eight cases, only two 
resulted in new trials based on non-DNA, newly discovered evidence.204  Of 
the pre-Edwards Illinois cases citing Ortiz, only two successive 
postconviction actual innocence petitions were granted.205  Considering the 
number of innocent people likely sitting in prison, three new trials is hardly 
a frightening number.206  Justice trumps finality; an innocent person should 
not serve time in the name of finality. 
IV. THE BIGGER PICTURE  
Edwards may have done far more than simply create a stricter standard 
for granting leave of court for successive postconviction actual innocence 
petitions.  Despite the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent statement in People 
v. Coleman that Edwards did not change the actual innocence standard, 
decisions interpreting Edwards in the lower courts suggest otherwise.207  
People v. Chest and People v. Cole demonstrate Edwards’s potential to 
expand beyond granting leave of court to file a successive petition to later 
stages of the Act.208 
In Antoine Chest’s first postconviction petition, he challenged his 
conviction of two counts of attempted first-degree murder.209  The trial 
court had specifically found that Chest was the shooter.210  In his petition, 
Chest produced an affidavit from another man charged with the attempted 
murders who claimed that he had pleaded guilty to and committed the 
attempted murders, and that the petitioner was not with him at the time of 
the incident.211  The court cited Edwards extensively and specifically 
emphasized the reliability requirement.212  The court denied this first-stage 
petition, finding that the new evidence was not completely exculpatory and 
 
203 People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. 2009); People v. Burrows, 665 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 
1996); People v. Starks, 850 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (reversing the trial court and 
remanding for a new trial because of new DNA evidence). 
204 Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941; Burrows, 665 N.E.2d 1319. 
205 See People v. Hill, No. 1-09-1657, 2011 WL 9692904 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 8, 2011); 
People v. Munoz, 941 N.E.2d 318, 325, 328 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); see also discussion supra 
notes 184–91 and accompanying text. 
206 See discussion supra notes 184–91 and accompanying text. 
207 People v. Coleman, No. 113307, 2013 WL 5488934, ¶ 93 (Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).  In this 
recent opinion, the court upheld the Washington standard and rejected the State’s arguments 
that Edwards changed the actual innocence standard.  Id. ¶ 88–94. 
208 People v. Chest, No. 2-12-0687, 2013 WL 1296403 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2013); 
People v. Cole, No. 3-11-0787, 2012 WL 6862485 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 20, 2012). 
209 Chest, 2013 WL 1296403, at *1. 
210 Id. at *2. 
211 Id. at *3. 
212 Id. at *5. 
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that the petitioner had not shown that it was “more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted defendant.”213  The court used the 
Edwards standard even though this was Chest’s first petition, not a 
successive petition. 
Similarly, the petitioner in Cole appealed the second-stage dismissal of 
his first postconviction petition.214  Corzell Cole was convicted of first-
degree murder and attempted first-degree murder on an accountability 
theory.215  Travaris Guy was the passenger in a car Cole drove.216  When 
Cole pulled up at a stoplight behind a van with four people in it, Guy fired 
four shots into the van, killing one person and injuring a second.217  Cole 
sped from the scene and was later arrested in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado.218  At trial, Cole did not put forth a defense and was convicted on 
a theory of accountability.219  In his postconviction petition, Cole provided a 
statement from Guy, the passenger and the shooter, and claimed that this 
statement was newly discovered evidence because Guy had not yet been 
apprehended at the time of Cole’s trial and thus could not speak on his 
behalf for fear of self-incrimination.220  Despite the fact that this was not a 
successive postconviction petition, the court relied on Edwards.221  The 
court acknowledged that Edwards involved a successive petition and that 
this was Cole’s first petition.222  However, the court still found the Edwards 
standard applicable and held that Cole had to make a “substantial showing” 
of actual innocence.223  In its analysis, the court stated that Guy’s evidence 
did not “paint a colorable actual innocence claim” nor did it “make it more 
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted petitioner in 
light of such a claim.”224  Moreover, the court stated the evidence “is not of 
such conclusive character that it would probably change the result of the 
retrial.”225  The court did not cite Ortiz, but it did cite to the various 
 
213 Id. at *6. 
214 People v. Cole, No. 3-11-0787, 2012 WL 6862485, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 20, 






220 Id. at *3. 
221 Id. at *4–5. 
222 Id. at *6. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at *6–7. 
225 Id. at *7. (quoting People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 839 (Ill. 2012)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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holdings in Edwards that included the Ortiz standard.226  While both of 
these petitions probably would have failed under the Ortiz standard, and the 
court’s reasoning is solid in both cases, these cases demonstrate that the 
potential reach of the Edwards decision expands far beyond just successive 
actual innocence petitions. 
In People v. Davis, the court of appeals noted that the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s decision in Edwards provides a comment on the postconviction 
actual innocence claims spectrum.227  The court quoted the portion of the 
Edwards decision that added the reliability requirement for newly 
discovered evidence.228  The appellate court reversed the trial court and 
allowed the petitioner to proceed to the third stage evidentiary hearing.229  
The court did not rule on the reliability of the witness, instead directing the 
trial court to do so at the evidentiary hearing.230  However, once again, the 
Edwards decision manifested itself in first petitions at later stages in the 
Act. 
The effects of Edwards reach beyond actual innocence postconviction 
petitions as well.  In People v. Nicholas and People v. Smith, the courts 
applied Edwards to petitions advancing procedural claims under the cause 
and prejudice test.231  In Nicholas, the petitioner alleged in his successive 
postconviction petition both a procedural error—that his confession was 
physically and psychologically coerced—and an actual innocence claim.232  
In its analysis, the court held that Antonio Nicholas’s alleged procedural 
error, which was analyzed under the cause and prejudice test, needed to 
meet Edwards’s heightened standard, requiring a “‘more exacting’ or 
‘substantial’ showing of cause and prejudice to be granted leave to file a 
successive postconviction petition.  A ‘gist’ of a claim of cause and 
prejudice is insufficient.”233  Even though the scope of Edwards was limited 
to successive postconviction actual innocence petitions, the appellate court 
 
226 Id. at *6–7. 
227 People v. Davis, No. 3-11-0217, 2013 WL 161630, at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 7, 2013). 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at *7. 
230 Id. (“To be clear, our reversal is not a directive to the trial court to provide defendant 
the postconviction relief he seeks.  We merely find that the defendant’s petition makes a 
substantial showing of actual innocence and, therefore, he is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing.  Just as the trial judge did in Morgan, it is for the trial court herein to observe the 
demeanor of witnesses and assess the new testimony against the facts and circumstances 
previously established at trial prior to determining whether or not to grant or deny the 
defendant posttrial relief.”). 
231 People v. Nicholas, 987 N.E.2d 482 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); People v. Smith, No. 1-11-
1069, 2013 WL 1501787 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013). 
232 Nicholas, 987 N.E.2d at 487. 
233 Id. at 488 (internal citations omitted). 
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in Nicholas found that Edwards’s heightened standard applies to procedural 
postconviction successive petitions as well as actual innocence petitions.234  
The court in People v. Smith similarly applied Edwards’s heightened 
standard to the cause and prejudice standard, stating that the Illinois 
Supreme Court had rejected the argument that successive petitions should 
be evaluated under the same standard as first petitions, and therefore, 
“rather than merely presenting the gist of a claim, [the petitioner] must 
make a ‘more exacting’ showing of cause and prejudice to merit leave to 
file a successive post-conviction petition.”235 
Edwards has undoubtedly affected Illinois lower court decisions in 
postconviction actual innocence petitions beyond those seeking leave to file 
successive postconviction actual innocence petitions, and it remains to be 
seen if this trend will continue in light of the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
recent opinion in People v. Coleman.236 
CONCLUSION 
The standard for granting leave of court for successive postconviction 
actual innocence petitions in Illinois is in a state of confusion.  The 
Edwards opinion is self-contradictory in many ways, leaving practitioners 
and prisoners without a clear understanding of what standard applies.  
However, analysis of the language and precedent used in the case 
demonstrate that Edwards created a stricter standard that parallels the 
federal habeas actual innocence gateway standard for granting leave of 
court for successive postconviction actual innocence petitions.  
Furthermore, the appellate courts’ application of the Edwards standard 
illustrates this higher bar.  
Despite the court’s opinion in People v. Coleman stating otherwise,237 
the language of the Edwards opinion, the precedent used to support its 
analysis, and the addition of a new reliability requirement from Schlup 
demonstrates that Edwards created a stricter standard for granting leave of 
court to file successive postconviction actual innocence petitions.  Looking 
to the history of actual innocence petitions, Edwards’s stricter standard is 
unwarranted and unjust.  Under the pre-Edwards standards, few petitions 
resulted in retrial, and thus, raising the standard to parallel the federal 
standard needlessly limits petitioners’ access to the channels of 
postconviction justice.  Furthermore, considering the number of wrongfully 
convicted people who lack the benefit of exculpatory DNA evidence, the 
 
234 Id. 
235 Smith, 2013 WL 1501787, at *3. 
236 See People v. Coleman, No. 113307, 2013 WL 5488934, ¶ 88–94 (Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). 
237 Id. 
2014] LOSING OUR INNOCENCE 225 
standard for successive postconviction innocence petitions should not be 
enhanced. 
In conclusion, People v. Edwards heightened the standard for 
successive postconviction actual innocence petitions to closely match the 
federal actual innocence gateway standard.  Not only is the added 
stringency unnecessary because the prior standard functioned as a sufficient 
barrier to getting leave of court to file successive postconviction actual 
innocence petitions, but it is also unjust in light of the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Illinois constitution and the relationship 
between federal and state law.  Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court 
should overrule Edwards and return to the previous Ortiz standard. 
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